Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Abstract: Autocrats confront a trade-off when repressing threats: eliminating acute threats reduces the immediate risk of losing power but at the expense of policies that could reduce popular discontent, and thus the opposition's ability to mobilize. We develop a dynamic model where repression forcefully puts down challenges but detracts from dismantling the opposition's capacity and support. This creates an intertemporal tradeoff which can lead an autocrat to repress more—for longer—to consolidate their rule. We highlight how two kinds of equilibria arise in our model, and how each influences the measurement of autocratization, leading to a particular kind of attrition bias in empirical analysis of panel data on autocracies. We consider the effect of foreign interference to curb repression or hinder autocratic consolidation. Even under ideal circumstances, we show such interference can backfire, leading to more repression and higher costs for opposition actors even where an autocrat eventually loses power.