Center for Social Information Sciences (CSIS) Seminar
Baxter 127
Stable Matching as Transportation
Fedor Sandomirskiy,
Associate Research Scholar and Lecturer,
Department of Economics,
Princeton University,
We consider a model of matching with aligned preferences, highlighting the role of supply-demand imbalances in matching markets without money. Preferences are aligned if a matched pair of agents derive equal utility from the match, a condition capturing partnerships among firms, academic collaborations, organ exchanges, and markets with transferable utility and post-match bargaining. We establish a connection between stability, fairness, and welfare in these markets and the theory of optimal transportation. We use this connection to study inherent trade-offs present in these markets and obtain new structural results.
Joint with Federico Echenique (Berkeley) and Joseph Root (Chicago).
For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at [email protected].