On interactive wireless network security

Abstract: The fundamental tenet of information-theoretic security for wireless networks is that the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have different "views" (i.e., channels) of the transmitted signal. This poses a difficult challenge: how can we guarantee such channel conditions? In this talk, we start by studying simpler channel models, that can perhaps be instantiated in a controlled channel environment. The model is the erasure broadcast channel, with all nodes in the network experiencing statistically identical (but independent) erasures. We develop several results for interactive security for this model, including group key generation, message security and private message broadcasting. We will then describe our experience in validating some of these results through preliminary experimental results on a test bed. We will conclude our talk with broader horizons of information theoretic security, with applications to distributed control. Parts of this talk are joint work with Katerina Argyraki, Laszlo Czap, Christina Fragouli, Iris Safaka and Vinod Prabhakaran