Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Seminar in Political Economy
Baxter B125
History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms (Co-author: Daron Acemoglu)
Matthew Jackson,
William D. Eberle Professor of Economics,
Stanford University,
We study the evolution of the social norm of c∞peration′∈adynamicenvironment.Social∥s∥emer≥aspaernsofbehaviortˆarestab≤∈partdue→a≥nts′∫erprηtionsofprivate∈formationaboutthep∗,whichare∈fluencedbyoasionalp∗behaviorstˆarecommonlyobserved.Wefirstcharacterizethe(extreme)casesunderwhichhis→rycomp≤telydrivesequilibriumplay,≤ad∈g→asocial∥o∥fhighorlowc∞peration.In∫ermediatecases,theimpactofhis→ryispotentiallycounteredbyoasionalprominent' agents, whose actions are visible by all future agents, and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation. We also show that in equilibria not completely driven by history, there is a pattern of reversion, whereby play starting with high cooperation reverts toward lower cooperation.
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